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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,.

Case No.
15705

-vsDENON JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged by information with having
violated Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii), 1953, by distributing for value a controlled substance, heroin.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable
Calvin Gould presiding.

The appellant was found guilty of the

offense charged in the information, and was sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed fifteen

(15) years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmation of the lower
court's decision.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 17, 1977, the appellant was the object
of a "controlled buy" conducted by the narcotics division a'
the Ogden Police Department.

Annette Stubbs, a known prost
1

and addict who had agreed to work with the police, was util:
as an undercover agent and was the principal witness for th,
state.
Appellant's name was selected that evening by the
~Q

police officers involved from a list of dealers provided
by Miss Stubbs (T.13).

Miss Stubbs was strip-searched byt

female police officers and found to have no drugs or drug
apparata on her person (T.57).

She was then instructed to

telephone the appellant and "set up the buy."

(T .14) .

Miss

Stubbs then called the appellant on the telephone and toNl
she would "be down in about 15 minutes" and hung up.

Nothir

was said concerning a purchase of drugs over the phone (T.8:
Miss Stubbs noted that appellant had requested that she
make such references over the phone (T.84).

n~

Officer Pitc~

then gave Miss Stubbs two empty syringes and $60. 00

(T .14).

As police officers watched fron four separate sur·
veillance posts, Miss Stubbs was let off near appellant•sU
(T. 16) they saw her walk to the home and go in (T. 17) 15 mi:I
later, she was watched as she came out and walked several
blocks and down an alley to a waiting police car

(T.18).
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Miss Stubbs gave Officer Pitcock back the two
syringes.

One syringe was empty, the other was half full of

a reddish substance (T.20).

Officer Pitcock was able to

positively identify the syringes as those which had been given
to Miss Stubbs earlier by observing small marks which he had
made upon them without her knowledge (T.21,25).

The reddish

substance was positively identified by a police chemist, James
Gaskill, as heroin and a small amount of blood (T.160,161).
Miss Stubbs was again strip-searched by the two female officers
and found, again, to have no contraband or money with her
(T.59).

Appellant was not arrested immediately, but, rather,

a number of days later in order to protect Miss Stubbs' cover
(T. 3 2 I 3 3) •

Annette Stubbs testified that appellant had sold her
two balloons of heroin for $60.00 (T.85).

She said that he

watched that night as she prepared the syringe and began to
inject herself, but then left the room briefly (T.86).
he left, she switched the half full

When

syringe for the empty one

and acted as if she were cleaning it out (T.86).

She then left

and returned both syringes to Officer Pitcock.
At one point, the prosecuting attorney asked Miss
Stubbs if she had ever carried out an act of prostitution in
appellant's house (T.79).

Over defense counsel's objection,

she stated that in the past she had often taken "tricks" to
his home and paid him $5.00 for the use of a bedroom, after
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which she would purchase heroin from him with the proceeds
(T.80).

Elsewhere, she described her relationship with

t~

appellant as friendly and stated that she had often bought
heroin from him (T.78).
Although the appellant denied having ever sold
drugs to anybody (T.206), the jury found him guilty as char:
of distributing a controlled substance for value.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EVIDENCE OF ANNETTE STUBBS' RELATIONSHIP WITH THI
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO OCTOBER 17, 1977, WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED
AS IT DEMONSTRATED INTENT, PREPARATION, PLAN AND SCHEME OF
OPERATIONS.
Although evidence of crimes committed by the deft.I
other than those covered in the immediate prosecution is
generally inadmissible, Utah rules and precedent allow

cer~

exceptions to the rule.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 55 provides:
"Subject to Rule 47 evidence that
a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition
to commit crime or civil wrong as the
basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil wrong
on another specified occasion but,
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence
is admissible when relevant to prove

-4-
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some other material fact including absence
mot~ve, opportunity,
:i:_1_1tent, preparation, plan, knowledge or
identity.'' (Emphasis added).

?f wistake or accident,

See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232,

(Utah 1975).

This general principle of evidence was explained by
the court in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772

(1969):

"Concededly, evidence of other crimes
is not admissible if the purpose is to
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil
character with a propensity to commit crime
and thus likely to have committed the crime
charged. However, if the evidence has
relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible
for that purpose; and the fact that it may
tend to connect the defendant with another
crime will not render it incornpetant." (Id.
at 775.)
-Appellant contends that evidence concerning Miss
Stubbs' prior use of his home for Prostitution and connected
purchases of heroin was presented solely to disgrace the appellant
or to demonstrate his evil character and should, therefore, have
been excluded.

Had this been the motivation

and purpose for

the presentation of the evidence, it should have been excluded.
However the appellant is incorrect in asserting that purpose as
the motivation behind the introduction of the evidence.

When

questioned as tb the purpose of presenting the evidence, Mr.
Gladwell, the prosecuting attorney responded,
"The purpose, even though this type of
evidence may have a tendency to inf lame the
jury, the purpose for admitting this kind
of evidence is number one, to prove identity,
to prove she knows who Denon Jones is, and
she knows Denon Jones will sell her heroin.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Another purpose is to show knowledge and
intent. Why did he invite her to come
down that evening on the basis of a simole
phone call? What was the intent.
His intent on accepting her in the house that
evening. Why had she gone in there. And
you know, dozens of other occasions prior
to that. Hhat was the intent of him
receiving her into the home. Preparation,
plan, motive, a scheme of operation. All
of these things, your Honor~ we intend to
prove by presenting evidence regarding the
relationship between the defendant and
Annette Stubbs."
(T. 66) .
inte~k

Mr. Gladwell also noted that the prosecution had no
of putting the appellant's character in issue (T.67).

Although the circumstantial evidence surrounding
the "controlled buy" was carefully prepared and demonstrated
with virtual certainty that Miss Stubbs obtained heroin

wtt~

appellant's home, certain important questions were left

un-

answered without the additional testimony regarding Miss ~~
prior relationship with appellant.

How could Miss

Stubbs~

to buy heroin by calling on the phone late at night and simr;
asking if she could come over, without any mention of a

I

fu~1

I

purchase?
appellant?

How did she know that she could get heroin

froo~

How did she know to take syringes with her--tha:;
I

she would not be allowed to carry the drug out of the housei
How did she know how much money she would need?
Through the presentation of Miss Stubbs'

test~m

concerning prior dealings with the appellant, the state wm,
to demonstrate why she knew heroin was available for $30.0!'!

-6-
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quarter-teaspoon in the appellant's house (T.78).

The state

was ablA to show that an on-going business relationship
involving use of and entry into appellant's home and the
purchase of heroin existed between appellant and Annette
Stubbs (T. 79,80).
In State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d 636
(1972), this Court pointed out that "ordinarily the admissibility of evidence is for the trial court, and in the absence
of an abuse of discretion on the part of the court, the ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal."
further noted, in State v.

Lo~~·

(Id. at 637)

This Court has

supra, that "such harm as

there may be in receiving evidence concerning another crime is
to be weighed against the necessity of full inquiry into the
facts relating to the issues." (Id. at 775).
In the present case the trial judge exercised sound
discretion in admitting the above-noted evidence.

He was given

ample opportunity to consider its portent before it was admitted
and he allowed it in.
th~

Clearly, in his view, the importance of

evidence in explaining the situation and putting the entire

matter before the jury out-weighed any prejudicial
may have had upon the jury.

effect it

In the absence of any clear show-

ing of an abuse of discretion, the trial judge's ruling on this
matter should stand.
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In view of the strength of evidence presented by

t~.

prosecution concerning the "buy" which demonstrated that Miss
Stubbs entered appellant's home with $ 60. 00 and no heroin and

1

came out without the money but with a quantity of heroin plus
Miss Stubbs' testimony that she had, on that night, purchased
i

heroin from the appellant, the state contends that appellant

f

I

was not substantially prejudiced

by the admission of evidence\
r
explaining the circumstances preceding the actual crime being
1

prosecuted.
CONCLUSION
The evidence claimed by appellant to be

erroneous~

admitted was not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating the
accused's evil nature or character, but, rather, was for the
permissible purpose of explaining the circumstances surround-i

::: :::.::i:: ::.:::::n~o :::::s:::t:.~::::::.p:::::::i::~ pll
the introduction of the evidence and the fact that the

evi~~

tends to show that the appellant had committed other crimes
does not render the evidence incompetant.
For these reasons the state urges the court to uphol
the verdict and judgment of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
MICHAEL L. DEAMER
Deputy Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant
General
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